Using a simple model with interdependent utilities, we study how social networks influence individual voluntary contributions to the provision of a public good. Departing from the standard model of public good provision, we assume that an agents' utility has two terms: (a) 'ego'-utility derived from agents consumption of public and private goods, and (b) a social utility which is the sum of utility spillovers from other agents with whom the agent has social relationships. We establish conditions for the existence of a unique interior Nash equilibrium and describe the equilibrium in terms of network characteristics. We show that social network always has a positive effect on the provision of public good. We also find that in networks with "small world"-like modular structures, 'bridging' ties connecting distant parts of social network play important role inducing agents' contribution to public good. Assumptions and results of the model are discussed in relation to the role of social capital in community-level development projects and to the effect of innovation networks on firms' R&D investments.
Introduction
Our interest in studying the relationship between structure of social networks and private provision of a public good is motivated by two economic contexts.
First, in development studies, social capital is believed to be an important factor in enabling action by individual members of a community. In communitydriven development, an increasing number of field studies have found social capital to be a statistically significant predictor of provision/absence of community-level public services. For example, Pargal et al. (2002) studied establishment of voluntary solid waste management systems in Bangladesh and found that it is more likely to be undertaken in neighbourhoods with higher levels of social capital (note that the level of social capital is a function of the structure of the local social network). Similar effects of social capital were reported by Isham and Kähkönen (2002) on communitybased water projects in Indonesia and by Motiram and Osberg (2010) on household access to drinking water in India. This widespread evidence suggests that different levels of social capital, based on different network structures, may afford different potentials with respect to action for establishing a community public service.
The other context motivating our interest in the effect of network structure on production of public goods comes from economics of innovation. It has long been recognized that knowledge has characteristics of a public good and therefore, the argument goes, when production of knowledge relies on private voluntary contributions (for example firms' investments in R&D), knowledge is under-produced as compared to the social optimum (Arrow, 1962) . However, specific features of knowledge make the problem of knowledge production, in some key aspects, different from the standard problem with public goods.
First, important part of firms' knowledge generated through their own R&D activities remains tacit and held by the firms' knowledge employees. Unlike explicit or codified part of knowledge, this tacit knowledge, often tied in with the firms' own technological activities, does not flow freely into the public domain. Instead, it may spillover to other firms through the network of interfirm interactions such as a network of R&D alliances, a network of co-inventors, or a buyer-supplier network. As highlighted by the extensive literature on proximity and innovation (e.g. Boschma, 2010; Balland, 2012) , spillovers of tacit knowledge are most effective between firms that are cognitively proximate (in their knowledge bases). Such cognitive proximity may be developed by tapping into and utilizing the same pool of generally-available public knowledge.
Further, this 'global' public knowledge (that may be more readily available as codified) may be complementary to firms' own knowledge generated through R&D (a large part of which may be 'sticky' or tacit and thereby remaining within the firm and its local network). Such complementarity rests on the observation that firms' abilities to assimilate public knowledge and put it to use depend on the firms' absorptive capacities, which can only be accumulated by carrying out their own R&D activities (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989) . In addition, this complementarity between public and private knowledge renders pure free-riding strategy impractical, it stimulates firms' own investment in R&D, and therefore mitigates the problem of underproduction of public knowledge. The absorptive capacity argument suggests that the stock of public knowledge, and the desire to absorb it within the firm, is an important factor in driving firms' willingness to invest in R&D.
This interplay between the global-public and local-private types of knowledge implies that a firm may face a trade-off between investing in the production of public knowledge and in the production of private knowledge. Negotiation of this tradeoff may require that a firm has to take into account how its investment in globalpublic knowledge, besides the direct effect on its own R&D capabilities, stimulates other firms in an industry or a region to conduct research in technological domains that may be complementary (or similar) to its own. Knowledge generated through research by others may later spill over back to the focal firm through the global interfirm network of the entire industry or region. On the other hand, the focal firm's R&D investment in the development of its own specific technological domain is more likely to have an effect on complementary R&D activities of the firms with which it has direct connections. The latter local knowledge is then likely to be of immediate relevance to the focal firm and its network of directly connected firms. In contrast, the global-public knowledge is likely to have general relevance, akin to a general-purpose technology (David, 1990; Gambardella and McGahan, 2010) , which can be accessed by other firms in the entire network for further development, thereby generating global spillovers. The balance in this trade-off between investing in general/global and specific/local knowledge depends on the stock of public knowledge, structure of the global knowledge network and firm's own position in this network.
In both contexts (social capital in community development and knowledge spillovers for innovation), network structure is likely to play an important role in determining individual decisions to contribute to the provision of a public good. In this paper, we employ a formal model to examine this influence of the network structure. Our model differs from other models of public goods on networks in several aspects. First, our model is a model of interrelated utilities. The payoff to an agent may 'spill over' to another agent if the two are engaged in a social relationship. Therefore one's motivation to invest in a public good, in addition to the direct effect on one's own utility, lies in the increase of the well-being of other agents for whom one cares. Second, public good in our model is global i.e. available to all. Consistent with the two economic contexts mentioned above, the public good is provided on the level of the whole population. Third, besides the global public good there is a private good which, as we shall see, due to utility spillovers is akin to a local public good and the global and local goods are complementary. Thus our model can also be seen as a network game with interplay between global and local public goods.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews recent literature on models with public goods on networks. Section 3 introduce the model and presents private equilibrium allocations of public good. Section 4 discusses the relationship with earlier works. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Literature
Our model is related to two streams in economic literature. First, and directly related to our model, is the literature on network games. The recent decade has seen a surge of interest in network games including network games with public goods. Given the large and ever increasing number of studies in this field, we limit ourselves to reviewing only a few seminal works. For a comprehensive survey of recent advances on network games we refer the reader to Jackson and Zenou (2014) . Ballester et al. (2006) analysed a general network game with linear-quadratic payoffs such that the marginal utility of agent's own action, while diminishing in her own action, linearly depends on the actions of her neighbours. They show that this game has a unique interior Nash equilibrium in which agents' actions are proportional to their Bonacich centrality scores. 1 This striking result is significant because it bridges the gap between emerging economic research on network games and the established theory of social networks in the social sciences. Bloch and Zenginobuz (2007) proposed a model of local public goods with spillovers. In their model agents are distributed across a fixed number of separate jurisdictions. Agents divide their income between consumption of a private good and contribution to the provision of a local public good. Utility of an agent depends on her consumption of private good and the total amount of public good, which is equal to the sum of local public good produced in the jurisdiction and spillovers of public goods produced in other jurisdictions (all local public goods are perfect substitutes). The matrix of spillover intensities describes the structure of spillovers between jurisdictions. Bloch and Zenginobuz (2007) find that when the intensity of spillovers is relatively low (all row sums of spillovers matrix are less than one), the equilibrium level of public good is unique and increasing intensity of spillovers results in multiple equilibria. They also find that a jurisdiction that is more central (and therefore benefits more from public goods produced in other jurisdictions) contributes less public good. Bramoullé and Kranton (2007) examined a different public good game on a network. In their model agents have to make a decision about costly investment in a public good. This public good is local and an agent's payoff is a function of the sum of an agent's own contribution and the contributions of her direct neighbours. This game has two types of equilibria: specialized and hybrid ones. In a specialized equilibrium some agents invest in public goods while others choose not to invest but free-ride on contributions of their neighbours. Such specialization is socially optimal in a configuration in which contributors are linked to many non-contributors. Interestingly, a new link may reduce social welfare because it may reduce agent's incentive to contribute. Bramoullé et al. (2014) unified and extended the results of Bramoullé and Kranton (2007) and Ballester et al. (2006) . They developed a general approach to analyse games with strategic substitutes with linear best reply functions based on the theory of potential games and therefore encompass earlier works on network games mentioned above. They show that in games with linear best reply functions, it is the lowest eigenvalue of the interaction matrix that defines certain properties of the Nash equilibria such as uniqueness, number of contributors and stability. Under the specifications of the model that we study in extent in this paper, just as in Bramoullé et al. (2014) model, agents' best reply functions are linear and therefore the results obtained by Bramoullé et al. must also hold.
The second stream of literature on which we base our model concerns systems of altruistic utility functions (Becker, 1976; Bergstrom, 1999) . In this literature connections between agents are defined as interdependence between agents' utilities. In network games such as those discussed above, a social network is essentially the network of effects of one agent's action on payoffs of the agents with whom the agent is connected. In the literature on interdependent utilities the network accounts for the effects of one agent's payoff on the payoffs of her direct neighbours. Most research in this tradition concerns with some general properties of systems or models in which the network structure of interactions plays no significant role such as systems of two individuals or systems with a special pattern of interactions. 2 Notwithstanding the lack of interest in structure of interrelated utilities in this literature, some results on systems with general patterns of interactions are also useful, as in the model we develop in the next section.
Bergstrom (1999) studied systems of altruistic individuals and has shown that under certain conditions a system of interdependent utility functions can be disentangled into a system of independent utility functions which define individual preferences over the set of possible allocations of individual consumption bundles. Ley (1997) studied the optimal provision of public goods in the context of a additively separable altruistic utility functions. In his model, an agent receives spillovers from the utilities of other individuals with whom she has social ties. Perhaps surprisingly, he found that the Samuelson condition for optimal allocation in a model without interactions also holds in a model with interdependent utility functions. 3 Finally, in a recent study Bourlès and Bramoullé (2013) analysed a transfer game on a network defined in terms of interdependencies between agents' utility functions. They find that for any network and any utility functions there is a unique profile of equilibrium incomes. However on generic network equilibria are multiple, except on trees.
Our model, motivated by the two economic contexts discussed in the introduction is closely related to the both streams of economic literature discussed above. Following studies on systems of altruistic utilities, we analyse a population of agents woven into a network of social relationships where the utility of an agent depends on utilities of the other agents with whom she has direct relationships. And similar to network games we are interested in equilibrium outcomes and the relationship between network structure and equilibrium level of a public good.
Our model is different from other models of public goods on networks in several respects. First, in contrast to other network games with public goods, our networks are networks of interrelated utilities. Our interpretation of social relationships is similar to the traditional notion of close relationships between individuals adopted in the social sciences (Wellman, 1979) , which refers to feelings and sentiment based on reciprocity and mutual care generally found in social networks of kinship, friendship and social affinity. It may also be useful in case of networks other than social networks, such as knowledge networks, where it is reasonable to assume that the interactions 2 Examples of such systems include systems of utilities in which individuals care equally for all other individuals and systems with a fixed pattern of interactions e.g. Bergstrom (1999) examine a model where agents are located on a line and each agent is connected to exactly one agent on the right and one agent on the left (this system of utility functions can be used in the framework of overlapping generations to account for intergenerational altruism.
3 Also see Bergstrom (2006) . take the form of payoff spillovers from alter to ego rather than a direct effect of alter 's actions one ego's payoff. Second, in our model agents make contributions to public good that are global i.e. provided on the level of the whole population. In this respect it is different from most other models where public goods are local, i.e. accessible only by agent's direct neighbours. This makes it consistent with the two economic contexts mentioned in the introduction, because both community-level public services and public knowledge are in principle accessible by all members of a community.
Third, because of payoff spillovers, the private good, complementary to the global public good in our model, is in fact a kind of a local public good (Ley, 1997 ). Thus our model can be seen as a model with global and local public goods with some level of complementarity between the two. In the context of R&D networks it may correspond to a firm's investment in building its own absorptive capacities, which increases the value of public knowledge to the firm.
Model
There are n agents in the economy. Each agent indexed by i ∈ {1, .., n} has endowment w i = 1 which she divides between consumption of private good, x i , and a contribution to public good, y i . The marginal rate of transformation between private and public good is 1, and the amount of public good provision is simply a sum of contributions of all agents, Y = y 1 + .. + y n . Agent i's utility, V i , is sum of two terms. The ego part U i , henceforth referred as ego-utility, is a function of consumption of private good, x i , and consumption of public good, Y . Throughout the paper we use ego utility functions
where v(·) is a CRRA or isoelastic utility function. These functions belong to a special class of quasi-concave utility functions
that generate economies with transferable private utilities (Bergstrom and Cornes, 1983) and has been used earlier in models with systems of altruistic preferences (Ley, 1997; Bergstrom, 2006) . 4 It is also important for us that with this specification we obtain best-reply functions similar to ones in other network games discussed in the previous section. The alter part of V i is sum of utility "spillovers" from the agents with whom agent i has direct connections
Social relationships channelling utility spillovers constitute a weighted undirected network g with adjacency matrix A = α ij . We assume that utility spillovers are non-negative (α ij ≥ 0). Equation (2) can be rewritten in matrix form as
where I is the identity matrix and v = (V 1 , V 2 , .., V n ) and u = (U 1 , U 2 , .., U n ) are the vectors of agents' overall utilities and ego-utilities respectively.
Systems of interrelated utility functions
Systems of additively separable utility functions have been studied in Bergstrom (1999) and Ley (1997) . Bergstrom (1999) has shown that a system of interdependent utility functions (2) can be disentangled to induce a unique well-behaved, or "normally benevolent", system of independent utility functions when matrix (I−A) is dominant diagonal. Matrix of form (I − A), where A ≥ 0, is said to be dominant diagonal if its row sums are all positive, i.e. n j=1 α ij < 1, for any i ∈ {1, .., n}.
A dominant diagonal matrix is invertible and the elements of the inverse matrix are non-negative. When the adjacency matrix A satisfies (3), by inverting matrix equation (2) we can obtain
A system of utility function is said to be normally benevolent when an agent is never worse off from other agent being better off (Bergstrom, 1999) . When matrix (I−A) is dominant diagonal, the system of utility functions (4) is normally benevolent, because elements of B are non-negative.
Matrix B has particular meaning in social network theory. 5 Its elements can be interpreted as a measure of influence that one individual exerts on another. Notice 5 Matrices of form (I − A) and their inverse are well-known to economists in the context of input-output analysis. Matrix B = (I − A) −1 , where A is a matrix of technical coefficients is a Leontief inverse that describes the relationship between vector of sector outputs and final demands. When network defined by adjacency matrix A is strongly connected a diagonally dominant matrix (I − A) is an M-matrix (Horn and Johnson, 1994, p.131) that (I − A) −1 can be decomposed into a series of matrix powers of A: B = ∞ t=0 A t . The element ij of matrix A t counts the number of walks from i to j of length t discounted by the product of the edge weights along the walk. Thus B ij sums up all walks which start at i and end at j with appropriate weights (e.g. Ballester et al. 2006; Elliott and Golub 2013) . The vector of row sums of matrix B, known as vector of Bonacich centralities, characterizes agents' influence or power over the network.
We may interpret B ij in terms of utility flows: well-being of agent i spills over to i's neighbours (the intensity of spillover is proportional to the strength of social relationships) and then to neighbours of neighbours and so on. The coefficient B ij counts for total utility flow passing all walks connecting i to j and therefore it traces the total effect of an increase in utility of agent i on the utility of j channelled through the social network.
The diagonal element B ii corresponds to the part of the 'well-being flow' which returns to i: an increase in i's utility (e.g. due to increase in private consumption) spills over to i's neighbours increasing their utilities, but increasing their utilities, in turn, spills over back to i. The B ii sums up the direct effect (equal to 1), the effect of neighbours described above and all effects of higher order due to neighbours of neighbours and so on. In general, the magnitude of B ii is larger when there are many paths starting and ending in i, which depends on the size of i's network and its density, hence B ii is a measure of i's embeddedness in the network.
Best-reply functions
The system (4) defines agents' preferences over different allocations x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ). Agent i maximizes her utility V i by choosing x i given the vector of choices of all other agents x −i . Her optimization problem is
subject to
The first order condition for this optimization problem is
when x i ∈ (0, 1). In addition, an agent's budget constraint defines two possible corner
The LHS of equation (6) and the inequalities above represents the marginal utility of consuming the of private good. The factor B ii accounts for the sum of direct effect of private consumption on ego-utility U i and the return ('circular') utility spillovers. Similarly, factors B ij in the RHS of the equation describe the effect of an increase in j's utility on the utility of agent i. The RHS of the equation (6) sums up utility flows from all other agents and stands for the marginal effect of i's investment in public good on her utility.
Assuming that ego-utility functions are quasi-concave in the form of (1) the solution to the optimization problem (6) can be written in a closed form. The first order condition (6) is
Considering that the elasticity of CRRA function v(Y ) is a constant, y (Y ) = , and
where W = n is the sum of agents' endowments we obtain
Finally, the best reply function of agent i is
Notice that agents' best reply functions are linear in actions of the others. For properly definedx andB we can re-write BR i as
Therefore our model belongs to the class of the network games studied in Bramoullé et al. (2014) 6 and their results concerning existence and stability of Nash equilibria must hold for our model. However, following the approach of Bramoullé et al. (2014) , we would have to re-formulate our model in terms of the network induced by matrix B, which lacks a straightforward intuitive interpretation with respect to the original social network. The criteria for existence and stability of equilibria in the game would also be formulated in terms of eigenvalues ofB. Thus instead of relying on the general results of Bramoullé et al. (2014) , we establish conditions and prove existence and uniqueness of internal equilibrium in our model by solving the system of first order conditions (7). In this way we obtain the equilibrium allocation x in a closed form and can describe the equilibrium in terms of the original network (matrices A and B).
Equilibrium
We focus on the interior equilibrium in our model i.e. the equilibrium where agents' budget constraints (0 ≤ x i ≤ 1) are not binding and agents' first order conditions are as given by equation (7). Define vector χ χ χ as
where b = (B 11 , B 22 , . . . B nn , ), and letχ be the average of χ i over i = 1, . . . , n. The following proposition establishes conditions for existence of the interior equilibrium and describes how agents' actions in equilibrium depend on their positions in the network.
Proposition 1. If for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}: χ i ≥ 0 and (χ i −χ) ≤ n , then there is a unique interior equilibrium x * = {x * 1 , . . . , x * n }:
Proof. Assuming that agents' budget constraints are not binding the system of first order conditions (7) defining the internal equilibrium can be written in a matrix form as
where b = diag(B) is the vector of diagonal elements of matrix B and z is the vector 6 The general version of their model with heterogeneous payoff impacts and upper bound on agents' actions (Bramoullé et al., 2014, p.919). of agents' marginal rates of substitution:
and using definition of z i we have
i.e. in equilibrium consumption of private good x i is proportional to χ i . To find the equilibrium level of x i we only need to determine the level of public good in equilibrium, Y * . Summing up x i we obtain
where 
solving which we find the equilibrium level of public good
and, finally,
It is straightforward to verify that the conditions of the proposition ensure that the equilibrium consumption of private good defined by the expression above respects budget constraint 0 ≤ x * i ≤ 1. Therefore x * defines an interior equilibrium. By its very construction, this equilibrium is unique because the system of linear equations b = Bz has a unique solution.
Notice that the structural properties of the social network enters into the agents' actions through χ χ χ. Vector χ χ χ plays an important role in describing the equilibrium in our model: equilibrium vector of agent's private consumption x * is a multiple of χ χ χ, while averageχ determines the equilibrium level of public good.
Discussion
There are two opposite effects of a social network on an agent's incentives to contribute to public good, as can be inferred from (6). On the one hand, the social network lets the agent internalize part of the social benefit due to her investment in the public good. Contribution to the public good raises the well-being of every individual and the network channels the increases in other agents' utilities to the contributing agent. As a result, the marginal utility of the public good on an agent's utility (∂V i /∂Y ) is larger than the marginal effect of the public good on the agent's ego-utility (∂U i /∂Y ). The magnitude of this effect depends on the coefficients B ij , that measure how well is agent i connected to the others, according to the RHS of equation (6).
On the other hand, social network also amplifies the effect of consumption of private good. An increment to an agent's ego-utility due to more consumption of the private good spills over to the agent's direct neighbours increasing their utility. This, in turn, enhances utilities of the neighbours of the agent's neighbours and the process goes on. Thus, the private good in the model is, in fact, a kind of local public good. Part of the utility flow initiated by an agent's consumption of the private good returns to the agent. This accrues to the marginal effect of private consumption, and therefore we have factor B ii in the LHS of (6) which stands for the intensity of returning utility spillovers (or 'self-effect').
In this section we examine properties of the equilibrium in our model. First, we show that for any agent the 'global' positive effect of social network on provision of public good always prevails over the negative 'local' effect, i.e. the social network encourages the agent's investment in public good. We also show that despite the positive effect of the social network in equilibrium, the public good is under-produced. Second, we examine the impact of network structure on provision of public good. We focus on small-world modular networks and using some numerical examples we show the importance of social ties spanning across groups of densely connected agents.
Equilibrium and social optimum
Below we analyse Pareto efficiency of the equilibrium defined by Proposition 1 (section 3.3). We start by comparison with a standard model of public good, where there is no social network (A = 0) and therefore no utility spillovers (B = I), which may serve as a useful benchmark. Our interest in such settings, which we refer to as an egoistic society, owes to the result of Ley (1997) on the relationship between Pareto efficient allocations in egoistic society and socially optimal allocations in a model with interrelated utilities.
Social optimum in egoistic society
In a standard public good model a socially optimal allocation of private consumption,x e , must satisfy Samuelson's condition:
where z j is agent j's marginal rate of substitution between public and private goods. However if the production of a public good relies on agents' voluntary contributions then the level of public good in the economy is lower than socially optimal because agents are only willing to contribute y e i = (w i − x e i ) such that an agent's marginal rate of substitution between consumption of private and public goods is equal to 1. 7 Under this condition, an agent's first order condition is
Consequently, agents' marginal rates of substitution sum up to n rather than 1, as is required by Samuelson's condition. Thus in an egoistic society where provision of public good depends on voluntary contributions of agents, the public good is always underproduced: Y e <Ŷ e .
Egoistic society vs. social network In our model, the social network allows an agent to internalize the positive externality resulting from her investment in public good and therefore the agent's contribution to public good is larger than in an egoistic society. In the equilibrium defined by (9) the marginal rate of substitution of agent i is
i.e. social network lowers agents' marginal rates of substitution. Since the rate of marginal substitution of public good Y for agent's consumption of private good x i is diminishing with Y (for any reasonable utility functions including the chosen quasiconcave utilities) it implies that Lemma 1. Networks of social relationships encourage investment in public good; agents contribute to provision of public good more than they would do if there was no social network.
However agents do not internalize the positive externalities of their investment in the public good fully and therefore the sum of agents' contributions in equilibrium will never reach the optimum levelŶ e defined by Samuelson's condition.
7 By assumption the marginal rate of transformation between private and public goods is equal to 1. Lemma 2. The equilibrium level of public good, Y * , does not reach the socially optimal level of public good in the egoistic society,Ŷ e : Y * <Ŷ e Proof. Indeed, if we divide (7) by its LHS, we notice that
where we use the fact that for strictly diagonally dominant A, the diagonal elements of its inverse are always larger than its off-diagonal elements i.e. B ii > B ij for any j = i (Horn and Johnson, 1994, Theorem 2.5.12). Since the sum of agents' marginal rates of substitution is larger than 1 (required by Samuelson's condition), in the private equilibrium the level of the public good (Y * ) is always below the socially optimal Y e .
Social efficiency of equilibrium allocation Ley (1997) has shown that a
Pareto efficient allocation in a model with interrelated utilities is also a Pareto efficient allocation in egoistic society. Furthermore he has found that for quasi-concave egoutility functions all Pareto efficient allocations have the same level of public good. Given his result analysis of (in)efficiency of the equilibrium in our model could have been reduced to testing whether our equilibrium satisfies Samuelson's condition of the standard model (according to Lemma 2 it does not). However Ley's result does not apply to all Pareto efficient allocations, but concerns only allocations where agents' budget constraints are not binding i.e., x i < 1 for any i ∈ {1, .., n}. We proceed as follows. First, we find a Pareto efficient allocation that is comparable to the private equilibrium. Then we show that in this socially efficient allocation, the level of public good is higher than in the equilibrium, when agents' budget constraints are not binding.
The following lemma characterizes the equilibrium allocation in terms of its location in the space of utilities.
Lemma 3. In the equilibrium the vector of agents' utilities v * = (V * 1 , . . . , V * n ) is a multiple of the diagonal of matrix B:
where b = diag(B) and constant γ > 0.
Proof. From the first order condition (7) we know that
Substituting that expression into (4) we get
Factor v(Y ) 2 /v (Y ) depends only on the Y and is the same for all agents. Thus vector of utilities v * = (V * 1 , . . . , V * n ) is a multiple of the vector of the diagonal elements of matrix B.
According to Corollary 3 the equilibrium vector of agents' utilities v * is a multiple of the vector of matrix B's diagonal b. First, let us find all allocations x such that the vector of agent utilities v(x) is parallel to v * :
solving this system of linear equations with respect to x we get
Now assuming that an agent's budget constraint is not binding (x i ≥ 1) we find a condition on any allocation x such that v = γb. Summation over i gives us
using it in the expression above we have
The allocations x we obtain by changing (W − Y ) from 0 to W correspond to points in the space of utilities belonging to a ray starting at the origin passing through v * . Among them there is a Pareto efficient allocationx such that corresponding v(x) is the point where the ray intersects with the utility-possibility frontier. This allocation must correspond to x with maximum γ(Y ), hence for such allocation
from which we find the socially optimal level of public good in our model 8
and correspondingx isx
Comparing the equilibrium allocationx * withx i allows us to state our,
8 The Samuelson's condition for the egoistic society would result to the same expression forŶ .
Proposition 2. The equilibrium allocationx * is not socially efficient: level of public good in equilibrium is lower than socially optimal level of public good.
Proof. Assume that for any i, allocationx i defined above is such that 0 <x i < 1. Notice that the socially optimal level of public good,Ŷ , is higher than the equilibrium provision of public good
where we use the fact thatχ > 1/n, because in equilibrium an agent's marginal rates of substitution is equal to χ i and according to Lemma 2 the sum of marginal rates of substitution is larger than 1. The lower is the value ofχ, the closer is the equilibrium allocation x * to the utility-possibility frontier.
Let us verify that in this Pareto efficient allocationx the agents' budget constraints are not binding. Notice that for any agent i,x i < x * i :
becauseŶ > Y * and under condition of the Proposition 1, the budget constraints are not binding (0 < x * i < 1). This justifies our assumption thatx i < 1 made earlier, therefore equation (12) correctly defines the socially optimal level of public good.
Summing up the results concerning efficiency of the private equilibrium we may state that social network encourages agents' investment in public good, yet the equilibrium level of public good falls short of the socially optimal level.
Network structure and public good: importance of bridging ties
Although for any agent the 'global' positive effect of social network on the provision of public good always dominates the negative 'local' effect, the balance between the two depends on the position that the agent occupies in the network. The equilibrium vector of consumption of private good x * depends on the diagonal elements of matrix B. The intensity of return spillovers B ii depends on the size of i's extended network (number of neighbours, neighbours of neighbours and so on discounted by their distance from i), and on the density of connections within this network. The larger and denser is i's network the more possibilities are there for 'circular' utility flows and therefore the larger is B ii . The larger is B ii , the more i spends on private consumption, the less is her contribution to the public good.
Many real world networks have "small-world" modular structure: they consist of tightly-knit clusters (communities) of nodes with only a few connections running between the clusters. 9 Within a densely connected cluster there are multiple short paths connecting its members, while there are only few paths running across clusters.
This suggests that the intensity of spillovers within a cluster, which include return or 'circular' spillovers, is relatively high in comparison with the intensity of spillovers between clusters. Thus, other things being equal, for an individual in a cluster whose connections are local, i.e. within the cluster, the trade-off between global public good and local public good is biased towards the latter. This is because she is not internalizing positive externalities of her investment in the public good from outside her cluster. By contrary, an individual whose connections span many clusters may get more benefits from investing in global public good, because she is exposed to inter-cluster utility flows. To illustrate this point consider a network depicted in Figure 1a . The network consists of three fully connected clusters and one individual (type A) connected to each of the clusters through one member of the cluster (type B). All links have the same strength and high intensity of spilllovers α = 0.23, the value of the parameter in the CRRA ego-utility function is set at 0.8, so that the conditions of the PropositionFernandez, 1989), the agent in the centre (type A) is a 'liaison broker' because she bridges otherwise disconnected agents (type B) belonging to different clusters. An agent of type B is a 'gatekeeper' because she connects other members of her group (type C) to the outside world, across a structural hole (Burt, 2000) . Agents of type C do not fill any structural hole and play no brokerage roles in this network. An individual of type C has no direct inter-cluster ties, hence investment in global public good for her is less attractive than investment in private (local public) good, as she receives only limited benefits from the related increase in payoffs of individuals outside her cluster (low values of B ij outside blocks in Figure 1b) . Therefore in comparison with the others, individuals of type C contribute the least to global public good compared to the other individuals (Table 1) .
Consider the liaison broker at the centre of the network (type A). Her ego-network has the same size as networks of individuals of type C (each having three direct neighbours), but A's network is extremely sparse -there are no connections running between the three of her neighbours. Although A is positioned outside of any cluster, her ego-network spans across all of them. In contrast to individuals of type C, her balance is in favour of investing more in global public good, because the intensity of spillovers from all other agents B ij is not negligible (first row of matrix B as shown in Figure 1b) , while the intensity of return or 'circular' spillovers B ii is relatively low.
An individual of type B belongs to a cluster but has one external tie (with agent A). This tie exposes her to utility flows from 'outside world' and gives her more incentives to invest in global public good vis-à-vis individuals C. At the same time being a part of a tightly connected cluster, an individual B also enjoys higher intensity of return spillovers (unlike A who has the lowest B ii ). In addition, B's ego-network is larger than networks of any individual of other type. As a result, with respect to global public good an individual of type B contributes more to the production of public good than individuals C, but less than individual A.
With respect to overall production of global public good (therefore social efficiency), having agents like individual A in the social network shown in Figure 1 is important for two reasons. First, as discussed above, such agents tend to contribute more to (global) public good than agents with similar number of connections but whose connections are only local (agents of type C). Second, by bridging otherwise disconnected clusters, they let utility flows spill over cluster boundaries, allowing other agents to internalize part of the positive externalities from their investment in global public good and therefore encouraging the production of the public good.
The literature on social capital distinguishes between 'bridging' and 'bonding' social capital. Bonding social capital is associated with relationships in close-knit networks, i.e. in networks where individuals know each other such as families, close circles of colleagues etc. By contrast, 'bridging' capital involves 'cross-cutting ties' linking together groups of individuals otherwise distant or disconnected (Burt, 2000) . In the context of our discussion a bonding link refers to a social relationship within a tightly knit group of individuals, while a bridging link is a social tie that cuts across such groups. In the social network shown in Figure 1a , ties between agents of type C and ties between agents of type B and C are bonding ties, while the ties involving agent A are bridging ties.
The results of our model suggest that, other things being equal, bridging ties stimulate investment in (global) public good, while bonding ties tend to encourage private consumption (local public good). In a generic network, however, the effect of adding a tie largely depends on various characteristics of the positions of agents connected by the tie. As a consequence, singling out the effect of bridging/bonding tie on global public good is no trivial task. Nevertheless the effect becomes salient on locally-dense regular network structures. As an example consider the network shown in Figure 2a . In this network, agents are placed on a circle at locations indexed 1, 2, . . . , n. An agent is connected to k closest neighbours on each side and all connections are of the same strength α, hence the degree of a node in this network is equal to 2k.
Let us place a tie between two agents who are not connected (e.g. shown by a dashed line at Figure 2a) . 11 A tie placed between agents located close to each other on the circle corresponds to a bonding tie because the network is locally dense and has many alternative paths running between closely located agents (as is likely in cases where agents belong to the same tightly-knit community). On the other hand, a tie between agents located at the opposite sides of the circle is more of a bridging tie -such agents belong to different communities that are distant from each other. Thus varying the distance between agents connected by the newly added tie, we obtain a spectrum of bonding/bridging ties.
Before proceeding to the effect of bonding/bridging social capital, notice that in accordance with Lemma 1 the larger the value of α, the stronger must be the effect of the social network on public good provision for both bridging and bonding ties. Figure 2b reports on change in the provision of (global) public good due to the addition of a new link, ∆Y , as a function of the strength of social relationships α for the ties placed between agents at the distance d =3, 5 and 7. As expected, ∆Y is an increasing function of α. The panel chart in Figure 2c shows the effect of the shortcut distance, d, on the change in provision of the global public good corresponding to the addition of a new tie, ∆Y . As one can see, the longer is the shortcut distance, the more resources are spent on production of public good. This result suggests that, other things being equal, a bridging tie that brings together agents from distant communities has stronger effect on private provision of (global) public good than a bonding tie does and this, in fact, holds for any value of α ∈ (0, 1/(2k + 1)).
Notice that 1-D lattice networks such as the one shown in Figure 2a are specific instances of "small-world" networks of the Watts-Strogatz model (Watts and Strogatz, 1998) . In this model, each link in a regular lattice is 'rewired' with a given probability p: if value of p is small, then the resulting network is similar to the original regular Figure 3 : The effect of a bridging tie in Watts-Strogatz "small-world" networks for p =0, 0.1 and 1 and α =0.01 and 0.05. Top: Watts-Strogatz "small-world" networks. Bottom: Box-and-whisker plot of ∆Y as a function of shortcut distance d in "small-world" networks (500 simulation runs for each α,p, and d) network hence its local structure is rich in bonding ties. In contrast, if the probability of rewiring p is high the local structure disappears and the resulting network structure becomes similar to Erdos-Renyi random graph where most connections are bridging ties. In this family of networks ranging from a regular network to a random graph p serves as an index of randomness (see Figure 3a) . Using Monte-Carlo simulations we can examine how the effect of the shortcut distance on provision of public good depends on the randomness (hence local structure) of the network. Figure 3b presents a panel chart with the results of numerical experiment for two values of α = 0.01 and 0.05 and three values of rewiring probability p = 0, 0.1 and 1. 12 The left-most column of the panel corresponds to p = 0 which is the regular 1-D lattice and the same as the diagrams in the top row of Figure 2c . In locally dense regular networks saturated with bonding links a bridging social tie has larger effect than a bonding tie. This also holds true for moderately rewired networks (p = 0.1). However as the local network structure becomes less pronounced the effect of the shortcut distance vanishes (right column, p = 1).
Conclusions
What does our model say with respect to the two economic contexts mentioned in the introduction to this paper? The first and obvious conclusion is that networks of mutual care and reciprocity may help to mitigate the classical problem of underprovision of public good. An early author on social capital wrote: "The individual is helpless socially, if left entirely to himself. [. . . ] If he may come into contact with his neighbor, and they with other neighbors, there will be an accumulation of social capital, which may immediately satisfy his social needs and which may bear a social potentiality sufficient to the substantial improvement of living conditions in the whole community." (Hanifan, 1916, p.130) In our model it is the network of social relationships that helps an individual to appreciate the fact that a personal contribution to the provision of a public good can make not only a direct difference for herself, but also her action has an effect on the whole community which pays back in terms of increased well-being of the others for whom she cares.
The model, however, is overly simple to account in full for the complex dynamic relationships between individual action and social capital. While social capital is often used in the implementation of community-level development projects, it is also simultaneously built as it is used, not least through the establishment of community public services (cf. Falk and Kilpatrick, 2000) . In addition to being an attribute of a community as a whole (for example, in the form of generalized trust), social capital has also been argued to be an attribute of individuals (Bourdieu, 1986; Portes, 2000; Paldam, 2005) . The latter is observable as the "ability of people to cooperate voluntarily" (Portes, 2000, p. 2), or as the "size" or structure of an individuals network ties (Burt, 2000; Bourdieu, 1986, p.249) . It is then reasonable to believe that the two types of social capital (at the level of a community as a whole and at the individual level) are complementary and mutually reinforcing. For instance, by cooperating voluntarily with each other, individuals may build generalized trust in their community which may in turn nurture voluntary cooperation between individual community members. Thus the effect of social network is likely to be much stronger than what our model may have predicted.
In the context of innovation networks it is widely accepted that R&D collaboration networks between organizations are an important mechanism by which new technological knowledge diffuses through modern economies. This belief is also largely shared by policy makers, for instance, European Framework Programmes for research and technological development have devoted significant attention to policy instruments for encouraging and strengthening R&D networks within the European Research Area.
The results of our model suggest that R&D networks do not only serve as mechanisms for knowledge diffusion, R&D networks may also create additional incentives (e.g. through 'circular' spillovers) to contribute to the production of 'global' knowledge relevant to all R&D players as opposed to producing 'local' knowledge which is relevant only to the firm and its closest neighbours.
Another result from the model with respect to the overall level of investment in public goods is that not only does having social ties between agents matters, but also important is the knowledge of who these ties actually connect. Our discussion of modular small-world type networks suggests that a 'cohesive' network structure rich in social ties spanning across families, neighbourhoods, and circles of close friends can do better than a 'segmented' network structure where links are local to homogeneous groups. In the latter segmented network structure, an individual finds that investment in a local public good, which benefits the individual and members of her close social circle, brings larger returns than investment in a global public good that benefits all individuals in the entire network indiscriminately. In contrast, in a 'cohesive' network structure an individual would be more willing to invest in a global public good because a social network spanning different clusters allows her to observe that investment in global public good can make a difference for other individuals in her wider network beyond the circle of her family and close friends (without producing any detrimental effects). This result seems to be in line with some empirical evidence on community-based development projects which finds difference in the effect of 'bridging' and 'bonding' social capital in the establishment of public services (e.g. Motiram and Osberg, 2010) .
With respect to R&D networks, this result implies that the impact of policies to encourage R&D collaborations will depend on how policy-induced connections fit into the pre-existing structure of knowledge networks. Much work in economic and management literature on innovation networks emphasises the importance of long-distance ties, particularly for more substantial non-incremental innovations (e.g. Burt, 2000; Cowan and Jonard, 2003; Uzzi and Spiro, 2005; Cowan and Jonard, 2007) . By bridging otherwise distant parts of social and innovation networks, inter-cluster connections may foster information exchange, maintain diversity of knowledge and enhance individual creativity. Our model offers a different (and complementary) rationale for higher efficiency of network structures with inter-cluster bridging links: in a network with diverse ties, agents (individuals, firms, regions) have more incentives to invest in a 'global' public good because the network allows them to internalize larger part of positive externalities resulting from such investment. Thus policies to encourage collaborations within densely connected clusters (e.g. between firms within the same region) might end up stimulating an agent to invest in 'local' type of knowledge beneficial to the agent and its closest network neighbours. Such a suboptimal outcome may be countered by promoting the formation and strengthening of inter-cluster connections that stimulate agents' investment in the production of less specific, general knowledge. Alternatively, to encourage the production of such 'global' knowledge, policy makers may be better off promoting innovation in existing R&D networks that are sparsely connected.
